The Eleventh Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center: Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes In An Age Of Economic Expertise by Rakoff, The Honorable Jed
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 17, Number 1 2012 Article 1
The Eleventh Annual Albert A. DeStefano
Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial
Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center:
Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes In
An Age Of Economic Expertise
The Honorable Jed Rakoff∗
∗
Copyright c©2012 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
The Eleventh Annual Albert A. DeStefano
Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial
Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center:
Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes In
An Age Of Economic Expertise∗
The Honorable Jed Rakoff
Abstract
The title of my little talk here tonight is “Are
Federal Judges Competent?” This naturally raises the question of whether I am competent to
answer that question. I put this question to myself, and, after careful consideration of both sides
of the argument, concluded that I am competent to determine whether I am competent. As H. L.
Mencken once said, “A judge is a law student who grades his own exams.”
KEYWORDS: Judge Rakoff
∗The lecture herein was held at Fordham University School of Law on April 11, 2011. It was edited
on September 4, 2011 to remove minor cadences of speech that appear awkward in writing and
to provide sources and references to other explanatory materials in respect to certain statements
made by the speakers. Constantine N. Katsoris is the Wilkinson Professor of Law at Fordham
University School of Law. Constantine N. Katsoris—Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/
10197.htm. ** Jed Rakoff, United States District Judge, Southern District of New York. The au-
thor wishes to express his gratitude to the Becker Ross law firm for endowing this lecture in honor
of its retired partner, Albert A. DeStefano, a much-sought-after counselor in the field of corporate
acquisitions, a scholarly adjunct professor at Fordham Law School, a community-minded citizen
active in numerous charitable organizations, and a genuine lawyer-statesman. I should mention
that the Becker Ross law firm has no cases pending before me and, given the nature of its practice,
is unlikely to have any cases before me in the future. I congratulate the firm on its good fortune
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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
PROFESSOR KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. 
On behalf of the DeStefano family, I’d like to welcome you here 
tonight. Unfortunately, they could not be with us, but they send their 
regrets and their best wishes. 
For those of you who have never met Al DeStefano, let me briefly 
describe him to you. He started at Fordham Law School as an evening 
student, worked during the day, still managed to make the Law Review, 
and graduated at the top of his class. He then went on to become a 
partner in the Becker firm, specializing in corporate matters, particularly 
mergers and acquisitions. In his spare time, he devoted himself to 
numerous charitable endeavors and, as an adjunct professor on our 
faculty, shared his enormous knowledge and experience with our 
students. 
In short, Al DeStefano was a symbol of what Fordham Law School 
was in the past, he is a symbol of what Fordham Law School still is, and 
he will remain a symbol of what Fordham Law School will be in the 
future. 
Since its inception about a decade ago, the DeStefano Lectures 
have covered a wide range of timely and diverse topics, such as: the 
need for market regulation, the demise of Enron and its auditor Arthur 
Andersen, strengthening the protection for investors, making our capital 
markets more transparent, the subprime mortgage meltdown, and last 
year, Corporate Accountability and Governance. 
Tonight we are in for another treat. 
 
Our Constitution was founded on the premise of the separation of 
powers – legislative, executive and judiciary. The only way that works 
is with an independent judiciary, and a shining example of such 
independence is our speaker here tonight who will discuss “Are Federal 
Judges Competent? – Dilettantes in an Age of Economic Expertise.” 
Jed Rakoff was born in the City of Brotherly Love, the birthplace 
of the Declaration of Independence. 
He earned his BA in English literature from Swarthmore College 
with honors, received a Masters in Philosophy from Oxford, and 
graduated Cum Laude from Harvard Law School – a school at which his 
younger brother Todd is a faculty member. 
After law school, he clerked for the Honorable Abraham Freedman 
of the Third Circuit, spent two years practicing law at Debevoise, and 
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moved on to become an assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York where he spent seven years, the last two of which he was 
Chief of the Business & Securities Fraud Prevention Unit. After that he 
became a partner at Mudge Rose, and then Fried Frank, where he 
headed both firms’ criminal defense and RICO sections. 
While learning and honing his legal skills, he nurtured a second 
career – that of a songwriter. Indeed, the Huffington Post recently – in a 
feature article – suggested Jed Rakoff should become a member of the 
Supremes. 
Because of his dual interest in the law and songwriting, this caused 
a lot of confusion, because as you know the Supremes were a most 
successful female trio singing group with twelve number one records on 
Billboard’s Hot 100 list. Rumor had it he sought to join the trio as its 
first male vocalist, but negotiations fell through when he refused to 
shave his beard. 
After careful analysis, however, it appears that the Huffington Post 
article intended instead to suggest that he should be appointed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
His judicial career began in 1995 when President Clinton appointed 
him to the Southern District of New York to replace David Edelstein, a 
Fordham graduate of the Class of 1932. 
Despite an extraordinarily busy judicial career, he has managed to 
be a lecturer for two decades at a law school some 100 blocks to the 
North. 
A listing of the significant cases he presided over would take all 
night. 
Some of his more notable cases, however, include SEC v. 
WorldCom, which became a model on the issue of corporate governance 
reform. 
More recently, he initially rejected as inadequate a settlement of 
$33 million between the SEC and Bank of America in an action 
involving the non-disclosure – before the merger – of an agreement to 
pay billions of dollars in bonuses to Merrill employees. After much 
discussion and further negotiation, the judge ultimately approved a 
settlement of approximately $150 million, almost five times the size of 
the originally proposed settlement. 
Judge, as a stockholder of Bank of America, I do not thank you for 
your persistence; however, I must reluctantly agree with you – in the 
privacy of this room – that you did “the right thing.” 
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As far as agreeing or disagreeing with judges’ opinions, Judge 
Mulligan, my mentor, once wrote that exactly one half of the attorneys 
that appeared before him agreed with his decisions. 
That benchmark holds true for any judge, and Judge Rakoff is no 
exception. 
However, he has one distinction, in that one of his decisions has 
been universally acclaimed – without a single dissent. 
That decision – some thirty-five years ago – was when he decided 
to propose to Ann Rosenberg a/k/a Ann Rakoff, a/k/a the Director of our 
Corporate Law Program. 
Ann Rakoff works tirelessly and effectively to ensure the success of 
our Corporate Center; and, for that, we are most grateful. 
Bottom line, Judge Rakoff really doesn’t need an introduction. His 
record of outstanding achievements and performance speaks for itself – 
as an academic, as a jurist and as a practitioner. 
I cannot comment on his achievements as a songwriter. 
Therefore, without further ado, it is my distinct honor and pleasure 
to turn the proceedings over to the Honorable Jed Rakoff. 
LECTURE: ARE FEDERAL JUDGES COMPETENT? DILETTANTES IN AN 
AGE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTISE 
JUDGE RAKOFF: The title of my little talk here tonight is “Are 
Federal Judges Competent?” This naturally raises the question of 
whether I am competent to answer that question. I put this question to 
myself, and, after careful consideration of both sides of the argument, 
concluded that I am competent to determine whether I am competent. As 
H. L. Mencken once said, “A judge is a law student who grades his own 
exams.” 
But the sub-title of my talk – “Dilettantes in an Age of Economic 
Expertise” – is more revealing of what this talk is about, which is 
whether generalist judges and courts of general jurisdiction still make 
sense in an era of ever greater economic specialization. With the advent 
of the administrative state in the twentieth century, much of the power 
of both legislatures and courts was ceded to administrative agencies – in 
the supposed interest of enhanced expertise. But for the most part it was 
courts of general jurisdiction, and no special expertise, that were the 
ultimate arbiters of whether the administrative agency had acted fairly 
and in accordance with its legislative mandate. Over the past some 
decades, however, there has been an accelerating trend toward creating 
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specialized courts, that is, courts that specialize in specific subject 
matters. Although these courts vary widely, they are premised on the 
common assumption that limiting the subject matter of a court to a 
particular kind of controversy will bring an increased expertise to the 
resolution of such controversies. 
In New York State, for example, you have the surrogate courts 
(dealing with probate matters), the housing courts, the family courts, the 
drug courts, and so forth. Although the trend is less pronounced at the 
federal level, even there you have the bankruptcy courts, the tax court, 
the court of international trade, and, of particular interest, two appellate 
courts that have a semi-specialized jurisdiction: the D.C. Circuit, which 
has exclusive jurisdiction over many, though not all, administrative 
appeals, and the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent appeals. In a more diffuse sense, you also have the growth within 
administrative agencies of administrative law courts that are called upon 
to adjudicate certain controversies in their specialized areas. 
Very recently, there has also been a trend in many states to create 
specialized courts to deal with corporate and business disputes. Part of 
the impetus for this development comes from the success of the 
Delaware Chancery Court, which, somewhat ironically, did not begin as 
a specialized court but has in some sense come to be viewed as one 
because it deals with so many corporate law issues in a state where most 
large U.S. corporations are incorporated. (Incidentally, Delaware’s 
hegemony in this regard is now being challenged by such diverse places 
as Nevada and the Cayman Islands; but over sixty percent of Fortune 
500 companies are still incorporated in Delaware.) 
In any event, it is widely perceived that part of Delaware’s 
attractiveness to business is not just its pro-business corporate laws 
themselves, but also the expertise of its courts in interpreting those laws, 
and the result has been that no fewer than nineteen other states have 
created specialized business courts. In New York State, for example, 
this takes the form of the Commercial Part of the New York State 
Supreme Court, where complex commercial cases are sent for expedited 
treatment. 
While it may be too soon to judge these new business courts, so far 
they seem to have been well received. But partly this is because the 
judges who have been assigned to them are often the most experienced 
and best regarded judges from the courts of general jurisdiction; so it is 
difficult to tell whether the success is the result of specialization or of 
simply staffing these courts with the best generalist judges. Still, it has 
been suggested that even these very good generalist judges, when called 
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upon to limit their focus to sophisticated business cases, develop an 
enhanced expertise that makes them better able to understand the 
financial, economic, and commercial complexities of these cases, and 
thus better able to render more informed and fairer decisions. If so, the 
argument goes, would it not make sense to develop a specialized 
business court at the federal level as well, staffed, perhaps, by judges 
who by education or experience have particular expertise in complex 
business, financial, commercial, and economic issues? 
The question is a fair one. At present, the jurisdiction of the federal 
district courts is so broad that no judge readily develops more than a 
passing expertise in more than a few areas. On any given day, a typical 
federal judge might have to give some attention to, say, a narcotics case, 
a securities fraud action, a maritime dispute, a labor controversy, an 
employment discrimination claim, and a trademark case. By background 
or experience, the judge may have some special familiarity with a few of 
these areas; but there may be others that he or she will know little or 
nothing about. In particular, even if the judge knows the law in each of 
these areas, the judge may have little specialized knowledge of the 
factual context in which the law must be applied. So, for example, even 
a judge who is familiar with patent law in general will frequently be 
confronted with patent cases that involve obscure technologies that the 
judge must learn from scratch. Or, again, a judge who generally knows 
the antitrust laws will often be confronted with antitrust cases involving 
specialized practices in specialized markets about which he knows next 
to nothing. 
And just who are these federal district judges who are being called 
upon to judge these complicated disputes (assuming the disputes aren’t 
to be decided by an even less expert jury)? Well, for the most part, we 
are History or English Literature majors, who spent twenty years or 
more after law school practicing in some narrow specialty and who got 
on the court, we like to think, because we were reasonably intelligent 
and reasonably respected in our profession – although maybe it helped 
that we knew someone who knew a U.S. Senator. It also might have 
helped that we had never said or written anything controversial – which 
was itself a function of our lack of expertise. 
Of course, we all came to the court with one area of expertise, in 
that we had all been experienced litigators. Notice I use the word 
“litigator,” rather than the words “trial lawyer,” because in an age of 
fewer and fewer trials, some lawyers are now being appointed to the 
federal district court with little trial experience. But to be a successful 
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litigator, even outside the trial context, one must be a “quick study” – 
because you cannot hope to best your opponent unless you know more 
than he does about the underlying facts of a case, no matter how 
complicated. So, as every successful litigator will tell you, you do, for a 
short time, become incredibly expert in some arcane area – though you 
may forget it all the day after the case is over. 
In theory, one might argue, the former litigator turned federal judge 
might be able to use this ability to quickly master vast quantities of 
arcane materials to become an instant expert in any matter brought 
before her. But this assumes you have nothing else to do, that, like the 
litigator you once were, you can devote the great bulk of your energies 
to a single case, at least for a concentrated period of time. But that is not 
the fate of a federal district judge. If, in actuality, you have a docket of 
300 active cases, at least 100 of which are moderately complex and all 
of which have some call on your attention, how will you ever find the 
time to become an expert, even in the ad hoc way of litigators? Hence, 
the argument goes, one must have specialized courts, where judges, who 
may often be appointed to such a court because of their specialized 
training, will in any event be confronted with a sufficiently narrow range 
of subject matters that they can develop the expertise necessary to really 
understand such cases. 
Such arguments, as I say, are not without force. But there are, I 
would like now to suggest, at least five fundamental reasons why the 
creation of a federal business court, or, indeed, the creation of any more 
specialized federal courts than we already have, would be a major 
mistake. 
First, judicial specialization tends to obscure what judges are really 
supposed to do, which is to apply reason, legal principles, and basic 
moral values to the resolution of controversies. As the great Harvard 
Law expert on administrative law, Louis Jaffe, stated in explaining why 
administrative review should ultimately be vested in courts of general 
jurisdiction: “the constitutional courts of this country are the 
acknowledged architects and guarantors of the integrity of the legal 
system.”1 
                                                                                                                                         
1 LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 589-90 (1965).  He 
added: “I use integrity here in its specific sense of unity and coherence and in its more 
general sense of the effectuation of the values upon which this unity and coherence are 
built.” Id. 
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This is true even in those instances where judges are appointed or 
elected to generalist courts on the assumption that they will promote a 
particular policy or agenda; for in courts of general jurisdiction the great 
majority of cases to come before such judges will be cases as to which 
such a policy or agenda is irrelevant, and resort must then be had to 
what is commonly called “good judgment.” It is by this, and not by any 
narrow expertise, that judges are ultimately judged to be good or bad 
judges. 
It is also why judges are required to state the reasons for their 
decisions, so that they can be reviewed on appeal, as well as assessed by 
the legal community and the general public. But in specialized courts, 
judges, rather than having to clearly state the reasons for their 
conclusions, can wrap their decisions in the cloak of expertise, to which 
appellate courts inevitably give deference. Specialized courts, I submit, 
quickly develop an impenetrable jargon that makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand how they reached their decisions. And 
precisely because of this obscurity, the appellate court, rather than 
admitting its mystification, defers to the lower court’s supposed 
expertise. As a former member of my court, the famous judge and 
lawyer Simon Rifkind, stated to Congress in opposing the creation of 
specialized federal courts:   
[W]hen you are dealing with a matter that concerns the general 
welfare of the United States, it is not wise to create a small group of 
men who become, like the Egyptian priests, the sole custodians of a 
body of knowledge and who sooner or later begin to talk a language 
that nobody else understands but which is common only to them and 
the practitioners who appear before them and who drift away from 
those general principles of equity [and] morality, which pervade the 
entire judicial system.2 
Second, because specialized courts deal with disputes specific to a 
particular constituency, they tend to be influenced, or even captured, by 
the interests and biases common to that constituency. Thus, as I will 
discuss further below, the Federal Circuit, in dealing chiefly with 
disputes between patent owners and patent challengers, only hears 
arguments that reflect the shared assumptions and prejudices of patent 
                                                                                                                                         
2 General Revision of the Patents Laws: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. No. 3 of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 175 (1967) (statement of J. Simon Rifkind). 
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owners and patent challengers, and eventually comes to share some of 
those assumptions and prejudices. 
Furthermore, where a court deals chiefly or exclusively with 
controversies involving a limited group of special interests, those special 
interests are much more likely to play an active role in the selection of 
the judges to that court. Thus, in the case of New York’s housing court, 
landlord and tenant lobbyists are widely believed to play a dominant 
role, fueled by campaign contributions, in the selection of judges who 
are known from the outset to be pro-landlord or pro-tenant. 
And even where the selection process is more neutral, a specialized 
court is much more likely than a generalist court to be affected by the 
judges’ personal ideologies, since, unlike a generalist court, the judges 
on a specialist court are dealing again and again with the same small set 
of issues. The fact that those issues may appear complicated, or require a 
certain amount of expertise to fully grasp, cannot disguise the fact that 
they usually involve competing values that no amount of expertise can 
resolve. As Circuit Judge Richard Posner, who certainly possesses a 
wealth of economics expertise, has written in opposition to a specialized 
antitrust court: 
 
Antitrust is a forbidding field to the noninitiate. Its practitioners are 
experts, but are they objective? Antitrust theorists are divided into 
three warring camps. One camp thinks the most important values 
that the antitrust laws are designed and should be interpreted to 
promote are social or political values having to do with 
decentralizing economic power and equalizing the distribution of 
wealth. . . . [T]he two other camps . . . are united in believing that the 
only proper goals of antitrust law are economic . . . [but are divided 
between] a “Harvard School,” [which is] prone to find monopolistic 
practices, and a “Chicago School,” which believes the same 
practices to be for the most part procompetitive . . . . 
 
These cleavages, reflecting deeper and at the moment unbridgeable 
divisions in ethical, political, and economic thought, would not be 
eliminated by committing the decision of antitrust appeals to a 
specialized court. They would be exacerbated. A [particular] “camp” 
is more likely to gain the upper hand in a specialized court than in 
the entire federal court system or even in one circuit. This is not only 
because appointment to the specialized court would inevitably be 
made from the camps, but also because experts are more sensitive to 
the swings in professional opinion than an outsider, a generalist, 
would be. The appearance of uniform policy that would result from 
the domination of the specialized court by one of the contending 
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factions in antitrust policy would be an illusion. It would reflect 
power rather than consensus.3 
 
Third, judges in specialized courts, typically appointed for a term of 
years, have a temptation to look over their shoulders at the impact of 
their decisions on their future employment outside the specialized court, 
thus compromising their independence. This is notoriously a problem 
for administrative law judges, who regularly seek employment at the 
end of their terms with law firms that have regularly appeared before 
them. As a result, it is widely believed, though perhaps unfairly, that the 
decisions made by an outgoing administrative judge near the end of her 
term will seemingly be affected by the interests of the kind of clients 
represented by the law firms she would most like to join once her term is 
over. 
This problem is not totally absent even in the case of life-tenured 
federal generalist judges who, because of the unfortunate state of 
judicial salaries, are departing the bench with more frequency than in the 
past (a problem further exacerbated by the recent tendency to appoint 
relatively younger persons to the federal bench). But if, even now, this 
presents a threat to judicial independence, it would be considerably 
exacerbated if such persons were judges on specialized courts, where the 
divisions are so much more clearly drawn and the threat to 
independence resulting from the desire for lucrative future employment 
might well become severe. 
Fourth,—and to my mind the most insidious problem with 
specialized courts—even  the best of judges in specialized courts tend to 
develop a tunnel vision, oblivious to developments in other parts of the 
law that should impact their decisions. As we all learned long ago, “the 
law is a seamless web.” The law strives to promote consistency and 
predictability, not only for their practical importance, but also, in 
Professor Jaffe’s words, “to affirm the capacity of our society to 
integrate its purposes.”4 Relatedly, judges are repeatedly called upon to 
balance competing objectives; it makes no sense for the balance reached 
in the rest of the law to be disregarded, or even overruled, in some 
                                                                                                                                         
3 Richard A. Posner, Will The Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay 
On Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 781 
(1983). 
4 JAFFE, supra note 1, at 590. 
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specialized arena, for no better reason than that the specialized judges 
are intent on promoting their own narrow interests. 
A good example of this problem, I reluctantly suggest, is the 
Federal Circuit. As noted, the Federal Circuit, while it has partial 
jurisdiction over a number of subjects, has exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent disputes and in this respect is a specialized court. Given the 
importance of patents in a modern economy, the experience of the 
Federal Circuit may therefore be suggestive of the benefits and 
detriments of any proposed federal business court. 
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982, primarily in response to 
complaints from the patent bar that patent law was being interpreted by 
the various circuit courts in radically varying ways, leading to 
inconsistency in the laws governing one of the more important areas of 
our economy. The circuit split, crudely stated, was between those circuit 
courts that favored giving strong protection to existing patents and 
strong encouragement to new patents in order to incentivize innovation, 
and those circuit courts that favored narrow interpretation and limited 
protection of patents, both out of antitrust concerns and because of a 
belief that too broad patent protection actually de-incentivized 
innovation. 
The real culprits here were the Supreme Court and Congress, either 
of which could have resolved these long-time splits through judicial 
decision or legislation. But, instead, they chose to duck the issue: the 
Supreme Court by refusing to grant certiorari, and Congress by 
pretending that this circuit split, which really reflected a clash of values, 
could be better decided by a specialized court that would bring 
uniformity to patent law. To that end, Congress, while leaving it to 
generalist district courts to still decide patent disputes in the first 
instance, created, in 1982, a single appellate court, the Federal Circuit, 
to decide all patent issues on appeal. 
This solved the immediate problem in that it guaranteed that the 
circuit split would be resolved, at least at the circuit level, by the 
creation of this specialized court. But no one should have been under 
any illusion that it meant that the split would be resolved by the 
application of some special expertise. The split was one of policy, and, 
in operational terms, it was largely a split between the objectives 
promoted by patent laws and those promoted by antitrust laws. By 
creating a court that had exclusive power over the patent laws and had 
nothing to do with antitrust laws—a court that heard disputes between 
members of the patent bar and rarely if ever heard from the antitrust 
bar—a court that was largely staffed by judges who, though almost 
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uniformly excellent, were frequently drawn from a patent law 
background—Congress guaranteed, wittingly or unwittingly, that the 
split would be resolved in a pro-patent fashion. And, indeed, over the 
next fifteen years or so, the Federal Circuit created a protection for 
existing patents and receptiveness to new patents that went well beyond 
anything previously seen. 
Almost from the outset, the district courts saw this as one-sided and 
unbalanced. But the Federal Circuit began overruling the district courts 
to a virtually unprecedented degree. District courts suffered a forty 
percent reversal rate in the Federal Circuit, compared to a less than five 
percent reversal rate in all other circuits. Was this because, as 
proponents of specialized courts might argue, the district courts lacked 
the specialized expertise that the Federal Circuit brought to bear?  Or 
was it because the Federal Circuit, oblivious to the kind of balancing of 
values that is the everyday concern of generalist courts, was off on a 
frolic of its own? 
The answer was supplied by the United States Supreme Court. 
Beginning in 1996 and continuing through 2010, the Supreme Court 
began reversing the Federal Circuit at a rate unmatched by any other 
circuit court, even the much maligned Ninth Circuit. Moreover, eight of 
these reversals were unanimous and none was by a bare 5-4 vote. Many 
were couched in harsh language, and nearly all suggested, at least by 
clear implication, that the Supreme Court believed that the Federal 
Circuit was using the cover of “expertise” to interpret the law differently 
from how it had been uniformly interpreted in other contexts. So much 
for the supposed benefits of specialization. 
A comparison with another so-called specialized court, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, is also instructive. Although Delaware law 
as a whole reflects a pro-corporate tilt, many observers, including this 
one, find the decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the 
Delaware courts generally, very well-written and remarkably free of 
jargon or cant. But although proponents of specialized business courts 
frequently point to this high quality as evidence of what a specialized 
business court can achieve, in fact I think it is substantially wrong to 
view the Delaware Chancery Court as a specialized court, at least in the 
sense of a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction. In actuality, the 
jurisdiction of the Delaware Chancery Court is very broad, comprising 
the extensive equity jurisdiction that marked the reach of the English 
High Court of Chancery back in the days when the courts of England 
were divided between the courts of law and the courts of equity. If, then, 
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the Delaware Court of Chancery speaks with the clarity and vision of a 
generalist court, it is because it really is, fundamentally, a generalist 
court. Because, however, its jurisdiction includes so much of Delaware 
corporate law, and because so many large corporations are incorporated 
in Delaware, its decisions have a huge impact on the development of 
corporate law everywhere. 
In much the same way, because Wall Street is located in the 
Southern District of New York, more cases involving high finance are 
brought in my district than in any other federal district and so our 
decisions frequently have impact in this area; but this does not mean that 
we are a specialized court, or that our decisions require the exercise of 
some supposed expertise unobtainable by district judges in other 
districts, or that we do not pay a lot of attention to what other districts, 
and circuits, say about these issues. Like all generalist courts, and unlike 
truly specialized courts, we are the beneficiaries of cross-fertilization. 
And you don’t need Darwin or Mendel to tell you that cross-fertilization 
is a good thing. 
 Fifth, and finally, I would go so far as to suggest that a judge’s 
lack of specialized expertise is frequently a benefit, rather than a 
detriment, in reaching the right decision. Because what does a good 
judge do if he doesn’t understand some complexity in some abstruse 
area?  He requires the lawyers to explain it to him, in language he can 
understand. And the result, almost always, is that he comes to appreciate 
that the dispute before him cannot be resolved by the exercise of any 
supposed expertise but only by the careful weighing of competing 
interests and values well familiar to every judge. After many years on 
the bench, this is what Justice Holmes had to say on this subject: 
Having to listen to arguments, now about railroad business, now 
about a patent, now about an admiralty case, now about mining law 
and so on, a thousand times I have thought that I was hopelessly 
stupid [but] as many times have found that when I got hold of the 
language there was no such thing as a difficult case.5 
I am not sure I could say it any better than that; and, even if I could, 
when you have Oliver Wendell Holmes on your side, it is time to sit 
down. So, let me simply conclude by giving my answer to my original 
question: Are federal judges competent?  Competent to appreciate every 
                                                                                                                                         
5 Letter to John C.H. Wu (May 14, 1923), in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, HIS 
BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 163-63 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 
1936); Posner, supra note 3, at 787 (quoting id.). 
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nuance of every jargon-filled specialty? - perhaps not. But competent to 
judge, well and with understanding, the essential disputes brought 
before us in every area of our jurisdiction? - you bet! 
  
 
